

# Privacy-Preserving Publication of User Locations in the Proximity of Sensitive Sites



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
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# Privacy Threat

Hu et al., "Privacy Aware Location Publishing for Moving Clients"



## Location Publishing

- Traffic congestion control
- Infrastructure planning
- Snapshot at 2pm

## Hospital Data (external)

<i>Time</i>	<i>Specialty</i>
01:00 PM	Dentistry
02:00 PM	Cardiology
04:00 PM	Surgery



# Attack

- Attack: Associate a site **s** with **fewer** than **K** users


```
SELECT user.id, site.id
FROM U as user, S as site
WHERE distance(user.mbr, site.mbr) =
      SELECT MIN(distance(U.mbr, S.mbr))
      FROM U, S
      WHERE S.id = site.id
```

- Attack is successful in the previous slide:

**<u1, h>**



# Solution Outline ( $K$ -anonymity)



□ Attack,  $K=2$

$\langle u_1, s_1 \rangle$

$\langle u_5, s_1 \rangle$

$\langle u_3, s_2 \rangle$

$\langle u_4, s_2 \rangle$

**NOT** successful



# Problem Statement

- User set  $U$ , sensitive sites set  $S$
- Mapping  $M: S \rightarrow 2^U$

$$\forall s \in S, |M(s)| = K$$

$$\forall s_1, s_2 \in S, M(s_1) \cap M(s_2) = \emptyset$$

- Minimize Generalization Cost (**GGC**)

$$GGC(M) = \sum_{s \in S} Area(MBR(\{s\} \cup M(s)))$$



## Related work: Query Privacy in LBS


- Relies on Spatial K-anonymity as well
  - Gedik & Liu, ICDCS '05
  - Mokbel et al., VLDB '06
  - Kalnis et al., TKDE '07
  - ...
- But anonymizes a **single** query
  - Equivalent to  $|S|=1$
- In our problem  $|S| \gg 1$ 
  - More difficult to solve



# Related work: “Local” algorithm

[HXD+07] Hu H., Xu J., Du J., Ng J.K.Y., “Privacy Aware Location Publishing for Moving Clients”, TR, Hong Kong Baptist Univ., 2007


[www.comp.hkbu.edu.hk/~haibo/privacy\\_join.pdf](http://www.comp.hkbu.edu.hk/~haibo/privacy_join.pdf)



□ Benefit:  
NumOfSites/Area



# Drawback of Local's Publication Format



2-by-2 publishing



# Our Approach

## MK: Monochromatic $K$ -anonymity



### □ Phase 1:


- Transform user locations to 1D
- Anonymization w.r.t. user set  $U$  ONLY
- Linear algorithm\*, 1-D optimal
- User groups independent of sites  $S$

### □ Phase 2:


- Assign each anonymous group to nearest site
- Resolve potential conflicts
  - E.g., choose assignment with minimum enlargement
- Repeat until all sites are covered



# MK Example



2D  $\rightarrow$  1D



Output  $(s_1, G_1), (s_3, G_3)$


Output  $(s_2, G_2)$



- Properties of optimal mapping in 1-D
  1. Each ASR/group has exactly  $K$  users
  2. ASRs have consecutive users in 1-D order
  3. Groups do not overlap in 1-D order
  
- Bichromatic clustering of  $U$  and  $S$ 
  - Each cluster has 1 site and  $K$  users
  - DP algorithm, linear in  $K$  and  $|U|$



# BK Example







# Experimental Evaluation

- Naïve competitor: **K-Nearest-Neighbors**
- NA Dataset (569120 locations)
  - $U$  and  $S$  randomly sampled from NA
- Performance metrics:
  - Anonymization overhead (CPU time)
  - Generalization Cost

$$GGC(\mathcal{M}) = 100 \cdot \frac{\sum_{s \in S} Area(MBR(\mathcal{M}(s) \cup \{s\}))}{DomainArea} \%$$





# Comparison with "Local"



N=10,000 Users





# Variable number of sites



N=569,120 Users



# Variable $K$



N=569,120 Users





# Points to Remember

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- ❑ Publication of user locations in the proximity of sensitive sites
  - More difficult than Query-privacy in LBS
- ❑ “Local” algorithm
  - Very Slow
  - Bad quality, if a secure publishing format is used
- ❑ Naïve KNN
  - Also slow
- ❑ Our algorithms: MK, BK
  - Fast & Accurate



# Bibliography on LBS Privacy

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<http://anonym.comp.nus.edu.sg>

